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Auditor Type, Firm Ownership and Auditor Reporting Under A 
Joint Audit Requirement:  
Exploratory Evidence from India
by 
ZOU Ting 
Master of Philosophy  
India is one of the largest developing countries in the world. Although many 
issues and phenomena arising from its transitional economy are worthy of research 
from an accounting perspective, the Indian accounting market is a field that remains 
relatively unexplored in the extant literature. One of the institutional features of India 
is that while it is mandatory for public sector companies and banks to have joint 
auditors, their appointment is voluntary for other companies. In a thesis motivated by 
this and other institutional features and the absence of related accounting and 
auditing studies conducted in an Indian setting, I examine the relations of auditor 
type and firm ownership with the types of auditor opinions issued under the joint 
audit requirement. 
Using a sample of 1,142 firm-year observations from the major Indian stock 
exchanges from 2006-2008, I develop an auditor opinion model to examine the 
relations between firm ownership, auditor type and auditor opinions under the 
joint-audit requirement that applies in India. Companies’ self-selection bias for 
auditors is also considered and corrected using the Heckman 2-step method. Based 
on the empirical results, I report as follows. First, Big 4 auditors are more likely to 
issue modified opinions than local Indian auditors. Second, the Indian government 
assumes a supervisory role rather than a collusive role and the joint-audit 
requirement is associated with a higher level of auditor reporting quality. Finally, 
companies audited by joint auditors are more likely to receive modified opinions 
than companies audited by a single auditor. 
The findings provide evidence of the importance of understanding the pattern of 
auditor opinion in India and the incentives of joint auditors, as well as the influence 
this pattern has on auditor reporting quality in a transitional economy.  
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Auditor Type, Firm Ownership and Auditor Reporting under a Joint Audit 
Requirement: Exploratory Evidence from India 
 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1 India: a large emerging economy with many unexplored business issues 
 
The importance of external auditing to modern corporate governance, the wider 
economy and capital market development is well-established in the prior literature 
(e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Streim, 1994; Gul et al., 2007). However, the 
importance of external auditing in India, one of the largest transitional economies in 
the world, is a topic that is relatively under-researched. According to Perumpral et al. 
(2009), in a trend that is driven by globalization, the attention of the world is today 
centered on two emerging market economies: India and China. This is especially so 
in the case of India, which is regarded by many as having a more favorable macro 
environment and greater potential for future economic development than China due 
to its liberal economy, British-framed legislation, and political democracy.  
India’s annual economic growth since 2003-04 has been reported often at over 8 
percent. More sectors have been opened to private activity; trade policy and the 
exchange rate regime have been further liberalized; and capital markets have been 
reformed, leading to an improved investment climate. Today, India has one of the 
fastest growing economies in the world with a compounded average growth of 5.7 
percent over the last two decades. The country’s total gross domestic product (GDP) 
at US $3 trillion makes it the fourth largest in the world in purchase price parity 
terms. 
World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) 2004 states that International 
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comparisons indicate that India has intrinsic advantages that should allow the country 
to emerge as a major hub for manufacturing and labor-intensive service industries 
--including accounting-related services. India’s intrinsic advantages include one of 
the world’s largest local markets; a large and relatively low-cost labor force and a 
large well-educated English-speaking population. To accelerate the development and 
fulfill the potential of Indian, it requires building on the existing initiatives and 
further strengthening of the corporate financial reporting regime and improving 
comparability, transparency, and accountability. Hence, a better understanding of 
Indian accounting and auditing is in urgent need. 
1.2 India accounting: some research issues 
 
The existing auditing research in India is focuses mainly on the audit fees (audit 
service pricing), Big 4 versus non-Big 4 product differentiation in audit service 
market, the convergence of Indian Accounting Standards (IAS) and the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Dugar et al., 1995; Simon et al., 1986; 
Ahmed and Goyal, 2005 and Perumpral et al. 2009). Only one paper studies how 
external auditing and managerial ownership relate to firm valuation in India (Ghosh 
2007). Simon et al. (1986) report that determinants of audit fees in India are similar 
to those of other countries; that is, audit fees are strongly related to client size, audit 
risk and complexity variables. Also, the existence of a premium fee paid to Big 8 
auditors (at the time of the study in 1986) is found. The author argues that the 
premium fee result is consistent with the results of studies of several other countries, 
which suggests the existence of product differentiation in the market for audit 
services. Dugar et al. (1995) try to take a further step to examine Indian audit service 
market taking the public sector companies versus the private sector companies 
approach and find fees difference between these two sectors. Additionally, Ghosh, 
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(2007) reports that the number of auditors employed and firm performance are 
positively related in Indian companies, suggesting external monitoring enhances firm 
performance. 
1.3 Motivations of the study 
 
India imposes a special legal requirement on its government-owned companies 
and banks by obliging them to employ joint auditors for their annual statutory audit. 
This joint audit regulatory requirement is a feature of the Indian market that is not 
commonly observed in other countries, only France and Denmark have similar rules. 
    My study is motivated by the following two factors. First, prior accounting and 
auditing studies carried out in India mainly focus on reviewing the general auditing 
service market and the audit fees issue (Simon et al., 1986; Dugar et al., 1995). 
However, we know little about other important accounting and auditing research 
issues such as the relation between the Indian government and auditors and factors 
influencing the types of opinions Indian auditors issue. These two questions are both 
investigated in this study. 
Second, although the joint audit requirement provides a unique institutional 
setting for analysis, to the best of my knowledge, no research has been carried out in 
this field in India to date. Although Francis et al. (2009) examine auditor choice for 
listed companies in France where two (joint) auditors are required by law, the 
institutional environment and accounting market in India are quite different from 
those in France. It is not clear whether the results of Francis et al. (2009) can be 
generalized to a different institutional setting. This thesis takes the initiative by 
examining the relation between the joint audit requirement and auditor reporting 
quality in India. 
1.4 Results of the study 
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Based on a sample of 1,142 firm-year observations of Indian listed companies 
from 2006 to 2008, I develop an auditor opinion model to examine the relations 
between firm ownership, auditor type, and auditor opinions under the joint audit 
requirement that applies in the institutional setting of India. Companies’ 
self-selection bias for auditors is also considered and corrected using the Heckman 
2-step method. The empirical results support my conjectures that Big 4 auditors 
provide higher quality services than their local rivals. Further, Indian 
government-owned companies are more likely to receive qualified opinions than 
non-government-owned companies. Finally, companies audited by the joint auditors 
are indicated to have higher reporting quality than companies audited by a single 
auditor. 
1.5 Contributions of the study 
 
This paper contributes to the existing auditing literature in several ways. First, 
my study contributes to the Indian accounting and auditing literature by providing 
empirical evidence on the determinants of auditor opinion issuance in India. Second, 
this study fills the research gap on the influence of the joint audit requirement on 
auditor reporting behavior in India. Finally, the Indian government’s supervisory 
effect on local Indian auditors’ issuance of opinions to government-owned 
companies may provide a useful reference for other transitional economies, as 
auditing risks and failures in transitional economies are frequently documented as 
being a result of auditor collusion in which local auditors issue more favorable 
opinions to government-owned companies. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
 
    The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the 
institutional background. Chapter 3 presents the literature review and develops the 
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hypotheses. Chapter 4 discusses the research design and Chapter 5 reports the 
empirical results. I present my conclusions in Chapter 6. 
 6 
Chapter 2  Institutional background 
To have a better understanding of the Indian accounting and auditing 
environment and to lay the ground for development of the three hypotheses 
examined in this study, this section discusses the institutional background to the 
Indian audit market by examining Indian legislation covering the accounting and 
auditing profession, giving an overview of the auditing and securities markets, and 
addressing some special issues affecting Indian government-owned companies, 
financial institutions, and joint auditors. 
2.1 The legal framework governing the Indian accounting and auditing profession 
 
The Companies Act (1956) sets out the basic financial reporting requirements 
that apply to all companies incorporated in India. The Companies Act requires that 
financial statements be prepared, presented, published, and disclosed and that all 
companies be audited by a member-in-practice certified by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of India (ICAI). Schedule VI to the Act prescribes the form, content and 
minimum disclosure requirements of financial statements. The accounting period 
(financial year) adopted in India is from April 1st of the given year to March 31st of 
the next year. 
The Central Government enforces the Companies Act (“the Act”) through the 
Department of Company Affairs (DCA), the Company Law Board, the regional 
directors, and the Registrars of Companies (ROC). Every regional director’s office 
has a special unit for inspection of companies’ accounts. While regional directors 
have in some cases taken action against erring auditors under the Act, they generally 
refer such cases to the ICAI. The ROC is expected to scrutinize the records of 
registered companies for compliance with provisions of the Act. This function is 
hampered by a severe lack of capacity in terms of trained manpower and thus 
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restricts the ROC’s oversight of listed companies. The Company Law Board is an 
independent quasi-judicial body that receives petitions of complaint from the general 
public concerning the functioning and management of companies. The Company 
Law Board also receives applications for waivers from companies with regard to 
application of some of the provisions of the Act. Powers to implement penalties, 
notices, and sanctions are delegated among the DCA, the regional directors, and the 
ROC.  
The Chartered Accountants Act (1949) governs the accountancy profession in 
India. The history of the Indian accounting profession began with enactment of the 
Indian Companies Act in 1857, a piece of legislation that first introduced the concept 
of preparing a company balance sheet on a voluntary basis. The Indian Companies 
Act of 1866 introduced legal requirements regarding the maintenance of accounts 
and auditors’ qualifications. A system of auditor certification by the local 
government was initiated after a new Companies Act was passed in 1913. Following 
India’s independence in 1947, an expert committee was formed to examine a scheme 
for an autonomous association of accountants in India, which led to the enactment of 
the Chartered Accountants Act (1949) and the establishment of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of India in the same year. The ICAI regulates the 
accountancy profession and, in line with India’s imperial history, was initially 
modeled on the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW). 
The ICAI acts both as an examining body that grants chartered accountancy 
qualifications and licenses and as a disciplinary authority for its members. The ICAI 
has been a founding member of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 
since its inception in 1977. With a reputation for excellence, the ICAI has been the 
institution of choice for business graduates and aspiring business advisers and now 
 8 
has a highly skilled membership of over 110,000, making it one of the largest 
professional accountancy bodies in the world. 
2.2 Auditing market overview 
 
Small audit firms dominate the Indian auditing marketplace, even though the 
Indian affiliates of large international firm networks (such as the Big 4 audit firms of 
Deloitte, Ernst & Young, Price Waterhouse, and KPMG) audit approximately 47 
percent of the top 100 listed companies.1 The ICAI reports that about 53,245 audit 
firms operate in India, including members/affiliates of most of the international 
networks of accounting firms. In addition, about 1,000 firms audit at least one 
economically significant enterprise and about 15 of the largest firms audit more than 
70 percent of the top 100 listed companies. Government-owned companies, unlisted 
companies, public sector banks, and insurance companies are generally audited by 
small- and medium-size local firms. According to Report on the observance of 
standards and codes (ROSC 2004), this is due to the unremunerative fee scales 
prescribed for these engagements. In most cases, the regulator or the Office of the 
Comptroller and Auditor General of India mandates joint auditors for state-owned 
enterprises, public sector banks, and insurance companies.  
Members of the ICAI are required to follow a detailed code of ethics prescribed 
under the Chartered Accountants Act. The ICAI Council is entrusted with 
disciplinary powers that are exercised through its Disciplinary Committee. In matters 
concerning the public interest, penalty awards require confirmation by a High Court. 
Professional indemnity insurance is not compulsory and the ICAI does not 
specifically require or recommend that auditors take out such insurance.  
                                                            
1 Local affiliates of large international networks audit 11 out of the top 50 Indian companies and jointly audit 6 
other companies in the top 50 with another medium-size firm (for 34 percent of the top 50). They also audit 25 
out of the 51st-100th ranked companies and jointly audit 5 other companies in that bracket with another 
medium-size firm (for 60 percent of companies in that bracket).   
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The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and the Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (AASB) are responsible for assisting the ICAI in setting standards. 
Due process is followed in promulgating both accounting standards and auditing and 
assurance standards (AAS). Based on draft regulations prepared by the ASB and the 
AASB, the ICAI Council approves and issues new standards under its authority and 
prescribes deadlines for their adoption. 
2.3 Securities market overview 
 
There are two main pieces of legislation governing the Indian securities market. 
The Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act of 1956 provides for regulation of 
transactions in securities and aims to prevent undesirable transactions in securities. 
The other main piece of legislation, the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI) Act of 1992, is aimed at protecting investors and developing and regulating 
the securities market. Listed companies in India are required to comply with SEBI 
requirements as outlined in the SEBI Act and the Securities Contracts (Regulation) 
Act. To protect investor interests, SEBI-issued listing requirements specify 
disclosures applicable to listed companies in addition to other applicable auditing and 
accounting requirements. The SEBI uses listing agreements to require compliance 
with ICAI-issued accounting standards. 
India has three stock exchanges: the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), the 
National Stock Exchange of India (NSE), and the Calcutta Stock Exchange (CSE). 
According to its official Website, the BSE is the world's number one exchange in 
terms of the number of listed companies and the world's fifth ranking exchange 
according to the number of transactions handled by its electronic trading system.2 
The Website also reports that companies listed on the BSE in July 2009 had a total 
                                                            
2 Official BSE Website: http://www.bseindia.com/about/introbse.asp 
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market capitalization of USD 1.06 trillion. The BSE has a presence in over 400 cities 
and towns nationwide and has around 4,937 listed companies, with over 7,745 scripts 
being traded on 31st July 2009. 
The Bombay and National Stock Exchanges rely on external auditors to monitor 
compliance with the accounting and disclosure requirements. Listed companies are 
required to submit their financial statements to the Stock Exchange. The Stock 
Exchanges closely monitor compliance with requirements of their Listing Agreement 
and promptly act on publishing of any information that could mislead investors. The 
Stock Exchanges in India are generally satisfied if a publicly traded company issues 
audited financial statements on a timely basis, and such statements are accompanied 
by an unqualified audit opinion. The Corporate Relations Department of the Stock 
Exchange pursues any qualification by the auditors with the company and requires 
corrections by the following year-end. The Stock Exchanges lack sufficient number 
of qualified professionals and financial resources to systematically carry out 
monitoring of compliance with accounting and financial reporting requirements. 
In addition, the BSE SENSEX and the BSE 100 index are popular and 
well-known indices both domestically and globally. The BSE SENSEX, India’s first 
and most popular stock market benchmark index, comprises 30 stocks representing 
12 major sectors and is tracked worldwide. 
2.4 Special issues in India 
 
2.4.1 Government-owned companies  
 
Chapter 617 of the Companies Act (1956) defines a government company as 
one in which 51 percent of the paid-up share capital is held by a state government, 
the central government, or some combination of the state and central governments. 
Subsidiaries of such entities are also deemed to be government companies. 
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Under Chapter 619 of the Companies Act (1956), auditors of corporatized 
state-owned enterprises are appointed and re-appointed by the Comptroller and 
Auditor General of India (CAG). The CAG maintains and updates a panel of private 
sector firms qualified to undertake annual audits of state-owned enterprises.3 The 
allocation of audit work among these audit firms is based on a points system that 
gives credit based on information disclosed by the audit firms themselves, including 
the number of partners in the firm, the number of employees and trainees, the 
experience of the firm, and the number of years for which the partners have been 
associated with the firm. These audit firms have to provide the required information 
outlined above in standard questionnaires that are reviewed by the Office of the 
Comptroller and Auditor General of India. The boards of directors of state-owned 
enterprises determine the professional fees paid to their auditors on the basis of 
guidelines issued by the CAG and such fees are subsequently approved by 
shareholders of the company. The CAG conducts a supplementary test audit of all 
such companies on a regular basis. Depending upon the audit arrangements, as 
specified by these rules, the audit may be performed by either a private sector auditor 
or a state-appointed auditor, which may include the Office of the Comptroller and 
Auditor General of India or its appointee. 
2.4.2 Financial institutions 
 
The Banking Regulation Act (1949) empowers the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
to regulate financial reporting among financial sector participants including banks 
and financial institutions.4 The Third Schedule to the Banking Regulation Act 
prescribes formats for general purpose financial statements (balance sheet and profit 
                                                            
3 Corporatized state-owned enterprises include about 1,400 public commercial and non-commercial enterprises 
controlled by unions and state governments.   
4 There are approximately 60 Indian banks including 27 state-owned banks (19 nationalized banks and the State 
Bank of India and its 7 subsidiaries) and over 30 private banks. 
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and loss account) and sets out other disclosure requirements. Banking companies are 
also required to comply with Companies Act requirements that are consistent with 
the Banking Regulation Act. The RBI has issued circulars requiring compliance with 
the ICAI-issued accounting standards. All banks must publish audited financial 
statements within three months of the financial year-end. Since 2002-03, all banks 
have been required to prepare consolidated financial statements; during 2001-02, 
consolidation was mandatory for listed banks only. Private sector firms and foreign 
banks are required to seek prior approval from the RBI before appointing their 
auditors. The public sector banks appoint their statutory auditors (principal auditors 
and branch auditors) on the basis of recommendations made by the RBI (other than 
in the case of the State Bank of India, for which the principal auditors are appointed 
directly by the RBI pursuant to the State Bank of India Act); these recommendations 
are made from a list of RBI-empanelled auditors. Statutory principal auditors rely on 
branch auditors’ reports in issuing audit opinions on the bank’s annual financial 
statements. The list of RBI-empanelled auditors is compiled from self-disclosure 
forms completed annually by interested auditors. The appointment, re-appointment, 
or removal of a bank statutory auditor requires RBI approval. All state-owned banks 
must have a minimum of four (joint) statutory auditors and bank auditors must be 
replaced at least once every four years. No audit firm is allowed to audit more than 
four private sector banks and one state-owned bank during any single year. 
2.4.3 The joint audit requirement 
 
Joint audits are required in countries such as India, France, and Denmark 
(Francis et al., 2009; Thinggaard and Kiertzner, 2008). A joint audit is an audit 
carried out on a legal entity (the auditee) by two or more auditors who produce a 
single audit report and thereby share responsibility for the audit. The auditors are 
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typically audit firms rather than individuals. In a typical joint audit, audit planning is 
performed jointly and fieldwork is allocated to each of the auditors. This work 
allocation may be rotated after a set number of years to mitigate the risk of 
over-familiarity. The work performed by each auditor is reviewed by the other, in 
most cases by exchanging audit summary reports. The critical issues at group level, 
including group consolidation, are reviewed jointly and there is joint reporting to the 
legal entity’s management, its audit committee, a government entity, or the general 
public.  
According to SA 299 (Standards on Auditing, formerly known as Auditing and 
Accounting Standards 12 (AAS 12)), “All the joint auditors are jointly and severally 
responsible in respect of the audit work which is not divided amongst them. On the 
other hand, all the joint auditors are jointly and severally responsible for examining 
that the financial statements of the entity comply with the disclosure requirements of 
the relevant statute and for ensuring that the audit report complies with the 
requirements of the relevant statute and in respect of matters which are brought to the 
notice of the joint auditors by any one of them and on which there is an agreement 
among the joint auditors. Each joint auditor is entitled to assume that the other joint 
auditors have carried out their part of the audit work in accordance with the generally 
accepted audit procedures. Normally, the joint auditors are able to arrive at an agreed 
report. However, where the joint auditors are in disagreement with regard to any 
matters to be covered by the report, each one of them should express their own 
opinion through a separate report.” In addition, a joint audit is different from a dual 
audit in that the latter is performed by two independent auditors who issue their own 
separate reports before another auditor uses these reports to compile the final report 
on the entity as a whole. 
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Chapter 3  Literature review and hypothesis development 
Based on previous related research and features of the Indian institutional 
setting as summarized earlier, I develop three hypotheses to examine the 
determinants of auditor reporting quality in India, which is measured by the 
probability of receiving a modified auditor opinion (MAO). The first hypothesis 
examines the relation between reporting quality and the choice of two kinds of 
auditors: Big 4 and local Indian auditors. The second hypothesis examines how firm 
ownership affects auditor’s reporting behavior, and the third hypothesis examines the 
influence of the joint audit requirement on audit quality in India. 
3.1 Auditor types 
 
Firms of chartered accountants in India may be broadly classified into three 
groups: (1) local firms serving clients in one city or region only – these are small 
firms; (2) regional firms that have offices in major locations where their clients 
operate or that have formed affiliations with prominent local accounting firms to 
serve client offices in remote geographical areas – these firms are generally 
somewhat larger; and (3) very large national firms that have offices in most major 
industrial and commercial centers – represented by the Big 4 accounting firms 
(Simon et al., 1986; Marmousez, 2008). The dichotomy between Big 4 auditors 
(international auditors) and non-Big 4 auditors (local Indian auditors) is also used in 
this study, to examine whether there is a significant difference in auditor reporting 
quality in terms of the frequency of qualified opinions issued by these two groups of 
auditors. 
Following DeAngelo (1981), who argues that large audit firms are more likely 
to provide a higher quality audit than non-Big 4 audit firms, prior research suggests 
that Big 4 auditors provide higher quality audits to protect the firm's brand name 
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reputation and to avoid costly litigation (Craswell et al., 1995). Chan and Wu (2011) 
find that audit firms with more quasi-rent at stake provide higher quality audits in 
China’s context. The quasi-rents at stake are based mainly on audits of listed 
companies.  
Based on the Indian audit market and related literature, for audits on Indian 
listed companies, I hypothesize as follows: 
 
H1: Indian companies are more likely to receive qualified opinions from Big 4 
auditors than from local Indian auditors.  
 
3.2 Firm ownerships 
 
With its deregulated domestic market and British-framed legal system, India is 
widely regarded as a more liberal and market-oriented country than China, another 
globally important transitional economy, both economically and politically (Banerjee, 
2002; Ahmed and Goyal, 2005; Ren, 2009). Recent research supports the view that 
common law countries such as India have stronger investor protection laws and more 
developed financial markets than civil law countries such as China (La Porta et al., 
1997, 1998; Francis, et al., 2001). Moreover, the CAG conducts a supplementary test 
audit of all government-owned companies on a regular basis that functions as a 
review supporting better auditor independence in Indian government-owned 
companies.  
While evidence of auditor collusion has been found and reported in the Chinese 
setting (Chan et al., 2006), the Chinese institutional setting is uniquely responsible 
for such collusion. The history of government-sponsored CPA firms and local 
government ownership of the great majority of listed companies do not apply to India. 
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Hence, I predict that the Indian government has more of a supervisory rather than a 
collusive influence on auditor reporting behavior in government-owned companies. 
Therefore, my second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2: Government-owned companies are more likely to receive qualified opinions 
than non-government-owned companies in India.  
 
3.3 The joint audit requirement 
 
In India, it is mandatory for public sector companies and banks to have joint 
auditors, whereas other listed companies may choose between appointing joint 
auditors or retaining a single auditor. The joint audit requirement applicable to public 
sector firms provides an ideal setting for studying the role it plays in auditor 
reporting quality. This study takes the initiative by exploring the joint audit 
regulatory feature of India, an area in which little prior research has been conducted. 
To the best of my knowledge, Indian listed companies that choose to appoint 
joint auditors on a voluntary basis do so for the following reasons. First, the 
appointment of joint auditors is usually regarded as a means of providing the public 
with a higher level of assurance of auditor reporting quality according to social 
business reporting practices in India. Hence, some companies may choose to retain 
joint auditors to gain an advantage in the public sphere and improve their public 
image. Second, companies that are too big to be audited by one audit firm — 
typically public utilities and banks — often hire two or three firms that combine their 
resources to audit the company.  
Research on the joint audit requirement has been carried out in France, a 
country where all its listed companies are required to employ two audit firms to 
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conduct a joint audit. (The term “joint auditors” is synonymous with “joint 
auditorship,” “joint audit” or “joint auditing” in the literature.) Francis et al. (2009) 
find that French firms are valued more highly than neighboring firms in Belgium, 
which has a kindred legal and regulatory system. This finding suggests that investors 
may perceive two auditors to be better than one. However, comparing the audit 
quality between two countries involves many confounding factors such as the 
differences in auditing standards and audit markets. In my case, I investigate the 
impact of joint audit requirement on audit quality within a single country setting. 
Finally, Piot and Janin (2005) also argue that the joint audit requirement is perceived 
to have two advantages: on one hand, it offers a reciprocal check of each auditor’s 
diligence, and on the other hand, it reinforces each auditor’s independence. 
Consequently, joint audits should improve audit quality.  
Consequently, the following hypothesis is proposed regarding the relationship 
between joint auditors and auditor reporting quality as proxied by the probability of 
receiving a MAO.  
 
H3: Companies audited by joint auditors are more likely to receive qualified 
opinions than companies audited by a single auditor. 
 18 
Chapter 4  Research design 
4.1 Data collection and sample statistics  
 
The data employed for this study are cross-sectional data for the 2006-2008 
period extracted from the Prowess database (Release 3.1) generated and maintained 
by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), a leading private think tank 
in India. The data set includes 1,142 firm-year observations from the 2006-2008 
period for listed companies that were either members of the Bombay Stock Exchange 
A group (referred to as BSE-A 200 companies in this paper; see Appendix 1 for BSE 
company group classifications) or were BSE-B group companies audited by the Big 
4 auditors (Deloitte, ERNST & YOUNG, KPMG and PRICE WATERHOUSE; 
names of the Indian Big 4 affiliates are provided in Appendix 2). The top 100 BSE 
companies represent nearly 86 percent of BSE market capitalization and State-owned 
enterprises account for approximately 32 percent of BSE market capitalization. (The 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 2004). I combine the samples of 
the companies of BSE-B group that audited by Big 4 auditors with the data set of 
BSE-A group 200 companies for the reason that these companies represent the 
first-tier or higher quality listed firms in terms of financial situation and asset quality 
in India. The descriptive statistics based on this 1,142-observation sample and the 
definitions of each variable used in this study are reported in Panel A and Panel B of 
Table 1, respectively.  
The 1,142 firm-year observations are selected via a three-step process. First, I 
extract 2006-2008 financial data on all BSE-A 200 companies from the Prowess 
database, obtaining 600 observations in total (200 firm-year observations annually 
over a three-year observation period). Second, I manually screen for companies in 
the BSE-B group that are audited by Big 4 auditors, yielding 164 firm-year 
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observations in 2006, 224 firm-year observations in 2007, and 162 firm-year 
observations in 2008. This step yields an additional 550 (164 + 224 + 162) firm-year 
observations to add to the 600 identified in step 1, giving a sample size of 1,150 
firm-year observations. Third, I delete eight cases with incomplete data manually and 
obtain the final sample of 1,142 firm-year observations.  
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics grouped by the auditor opinion type 
(unqualified opinion or qualified opinion) that the company received during the 
sample period. In Panel B of Table 2, the paired T-test reveals a statistically 
significant difference between the means of Ownership, Own*Type, MS, MS*Big4, 
and Auditors_fees at the 1% significance level. The differences in the means of 
Ownership, MS, and Auditors_fees (between firms grouped by unqualified opinion 
and qualified opinion) are worth noting and suggest that these variables should be 














Table 1: Variable definitions 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Financial variables:    
Assets 3.137 0.875 0.556 5.753
Inventories 0.119 0.127 0.000 0.834
Receivables 0.184 0.142 0.000 0.731
Current_ratio 1.995 6.904 0.000 221.670
D/E_ratio 0.894 3.407 -79.460 43.210
ROE 2.209 6.469 -169.627 95.643
Other variables:    
Opinion 0.261 0.439 0.000 1.000
Ownership 0.103 0.305 0.000 1.000
Type 0.374 0.484 0.000 1.000
Own*Type 0.098 0.298 0.000 1.000
MS 0.853 0.354 0.000 1.000
MS*Big4 0.968 0.175 0.000 1.000
Auditors_Fees 1.140 3.635 0.000 62.280
Age 11.448 6.252 0.000 18.000
Panel B: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition   
Financial variables: 
Assets Common log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year (Mar 31st). 
Inventory The ratio of inventory to total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
Receivables  The ratio of receivables to total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
Current_Ratio The ratio of current assets to current liabilities at the end of the fiscal 
year. 
D/E_ ratio The ratio of long-term debt to shareholders’ equity at the end of the 
fiscal year.













Panel B: Variable definitions 
Other variables: 
Opinion The Opinion variable is equal to 1 if the auditor opinion is qualified 
and 0 if the auditor opinion is clean.
Ownership The Opinion variable is equal to 1 if the company is state / central 
government-owned and 0 if it is non-government owned.  
Type The Type variable is equal to 1 if the company’s auditors are all local 
Indian auditors and 0 if it is audited by at least one international auditor.
Own*Type The Own*Type variable is equal to 1 if the company is owned by the 
government and its auditors are all local auditors and 0 if otherwise. 
MS The MS variable is equal to 1 if the company is audited by a single 
auditor and 0 if it is audited by more than one auditor. 
MS*Big4 The MS*Big4 variable is equal to 0 if the company is audited by joint 
auditors including at least one of Big 4 auditors and 1 if otherwise. 
Auditors_Fees The total amount of auditor(s) fees that the company paid to its 
auditor(s) in the observed year.
Age The number of years for which the company has been listed in the 
observed year. 


















Table 2: The independent sample test, grouped by auditor opinions (N = 1,142) 
Panel A: Opinion group statistics 
 Opinion N % Mean Std.Deviation 
Ownership 0 844 73.91 0.077 0.267 
 1 298 26.09 0.178 0.383 
Type 0 844 73.91 0.370 0.483 
 1 298 26.09 0.386 0.488 
Own*Type 0 844 73.91 0.073 0.261 
 1 298 26.09 0.168 0.374 
MS 0 834 73.81 0.881 0.324 
 1 296 26.19 0.774 0.419 
MS*Big4 0 837 73.81 0.968 0.177 
 1 297 26.19 0.970 0.172
Assets 0 844 73.91 3.089 0.818 
 1 298 26.09 3.271 1.008 
Inventories 0 844 73.91 0.121 0.129 
 1 298 26.09 0.111 0.121 
Receivables 0 844 73.91 0.185 0.136 
 1 298 26.09 0.182 0.157 
Current ratio 0 844 73.91 1.971 7.708 
 1 298 26.09 2.062 3.803 
Debt equity ratio 0 844 73.91 0.960 2.709
 1 298 26.09 0.705 4.868 
ROE 0 844 73.91 2.328 4.206 
 1 298 26.09 1.872 10.506 
Auditors_Fees 0 838 73.77 0.622 1.231 
 1 298 26.23 2.596 6.584 
Age 0 838 73.77 11.636 6.347 
 1 298 26.23 10.919 5.955 
Panel B: Paired t-test between opinion types 
 t  Sig. Mean Difference 
Ownership -4.199  0.000** -0.101 
Type -0.498  0.619 -0.016 
Own*Type -4.019  0.000** -0.094 
MS 4.014  0.000** 0.108 
MS*Big4 -0.165  0.869 -0.002 
Assets -2.810  0.005** -0.182 
Inventories 1.203  0.229 0.010 
Receivables 0.210  0.834 0.002 
Current ratio -0.197  0.844 -0.092 
Debt equity ratio 1.113  0.266 0.256 
ROE 1.046  0.296 0.456 
Auditors_Fees -5.142 0.000** -1.973 
Age 1.701  0.089 0.717 
 
Notes:  ** Represents significance at the 1% level. 
       All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
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As shown in Table 3, I then run the paired correlations test using the 
1,142-observation data set and obtain the Pearson’s correlation coefficients. The 
coefficient on Ownership is positive and significant, providing further support for my 
argument in Hypothesis 2 that the likelihood of receiving a qualified auditor opinion 
is greater for Indian government-owned companies than it is for 
non-government-owned companies. In addition, the coefficient on MS is negative 
and significant, providing further support for the argument of Hypothesis 3 that joint 



















Table 3: Pearson Correlation Matrix (N =1142) 
 Opinion Ownership Type Own*Type MS MS*Big4 
Opinion 1      
Ownership 0.1455** 1     
Type 0.0147 0.3976** 1    
Own*Type 0.1393** 0.9617** 0.4267** 1   
MS -0.1337** -0.3242** -0.3524** -0.3308** 1  
MS*Big4 0.0049 0.0452 0.1402** 0.0599* 0.4371** 1 
Assets 0.0915** 0.3484** 0.5998** 0.3593** -0.421** -0.054 
Inventories -0.0356 -0.0465 -0.1054** -0.0435 0.092** -0.0222 
Receivables -0.0066 -0.137** -0.2169** -0.1288** 0.1742** -0.0158 
Current_ratio 0.0058 -0.0053 -0.0022 -0.0034 -0.0025 0.0106
D/E_ratio -0.033 0.0012 0.0499 0.0023 -0.0086 -0.0097 
ROE -0.031 0.0264 -0.009 0.0295 0.0207 0.006 
F_dummy 0.032 0.0916** 0.1381** 0.1006** -0.0686* 0.0702* 
 Assets Inventories Receivables Current_ratio D/E_ratio ROE 
Assets 1      
Inventories -0.1663** 1     
Receivables -0.3154** 0.1905** 1    
Current_ratio 0.0269 -0.0566 -0.0558 1   
D/E_ratio 0.1127** 0.0336 -0.0531 -0.0161 1  
ROE -0.0324 0.1495** 0.1424** -0.0256 0.8034** 1 
F_dummy 0.2247** -0.1627 -0.273** 0.006** 0.0415 -0.1196**
 
Notes:  ** Represents significance at the 1% level. 
       * Represents significance at the 5% level. 












4.2 Regression analysis 
 
My sample data show that Indian government-owned companies are inclined to 
choose Indian local auditors, about 94%, and non-government-owned companies are 
inclined to choose international auditors such as Big 4, about 69%. The reasons that 
Indian government-owned companies and non-government-owned companies have 
different auditor selection inclinations can be partially explained as follows. First, as 
noted in Chapter 2, the CAG encourages Indian government-owned companies to 
employ local audit firms. Second, as Indian government-owned companies generally 
have a good public reputation and a comparatively good financial status, they do not 
need the Big 4 audits to enhance public trust, especially given the joint audit 
requirement. Third, in comparison with public sector companies, 
non-government-owned companies cannot rely to any great extent on the Indian 
government’s reputation to back them up; therefore, non-government-owned 
companies are inclined to choose international Big 4 auditors to enhance their 
financial credibility in the capital market. 
Considering the reasons outlined above for the different auditor selection 
inclinations of public and private sector companies, I use the Heckman two-step 
method to control for self-selection effects. Heckman (1979) derived this two-step 
method to correct for selectivity bias in linear regression models with normal errors. 
Dubin and Rivers (1989) applied the same basic conceptual framework to logit and 
probit models and developed a two-stage binary probit method to control for 
self-selection bias in discrete-choice models. Following prior studies, I first estimate 
a probit auditor selection model and use the results to generate the inverse Mills 
ratios, which are denoted as Imills in this study. Next, I include the inverse Mills 
ratios in audit opinion issuance models for the clients of Big 4 and local Indian 
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auditors to correct for selectivity bias. The estimated coefficients of the audit opinion 
issuance models will be biased if the inverse Mills ratios are omitted from the 
regression. The self-selection model is given as follows. 
Step one: Auditor choice 
Probit(Type) = β0 + β1Ownership + β2MS  
    +  + Auditors_fees + Age + ε    (1)             
Step two: Auditor opinion issuance 
Logit(Opinion) = β0 + β1Ownership + β2Type +β3Own*Type + β4MS  
     + β5MS*Big4 + β6F_dummy + β7Imills  
     +  +   
     +  + ε                            (2) 
The definitions of the variables given above are presented in Panel B of Table 1 
and the descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Tables 1-4. Type, 
Own*Type, and MS*Big4 are excluded from Model (1) to avoid collinearity. 
Specifically, Type and Own*Type (the interactive term of auditor type combined 
with firm ownership) are employed mainly to capture the influence of auditor type on 
auditor reporting. Ownership and Own*Type are used to examine the influence of 
the Indian government on auditor reporting behavior. The coefficient of Type is 
predicted to be negative and the coefficient of Ownership is expected to be positive, 
while the direction of Own*Type needs to be empirically examined. Further, MS and 
MS*Big4 are included to test whether the joint audit requirement improves auditor 
reporting quality. MS is predicted to have a negative coefficient and as in the case of 
Own*Type, the direction of MS*Big4 needs to be empirically examined. 
Auditor reporting quality is measured by the frequency of modified audit 
opinion (MAO) rendered by an auditor. The higher the frequency, the higher the 
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audit quality. This is because lower quality auditors tend to give clean opinion to 
retain audit clients, but auditors will not render a qualified opinion unnecessarily. 
This MAO measurement has been used by Reynolds and Francis (2001), Chan et al. 
(2006) and Wang et al. (2008). An opinion is considered to be modified in this study 
if it is unqualified but with emphasis of matter, a qualified opinion, a disclaimer 
opinion (the sample includes only one such case) or an adverse opinion (the sample 
does not include any such case). Opinions that are clean are considered to be 
unqualified in this study. According to Auditing and Assurance Standard (AAS) 28 -- 
The Auditor's Report on Financial Statements, “the opinion with emphasis of matter 
is issued, in certain circumstances, an auditor's report may be modified by adding an 
emphasis of matter paragraph to highlight a matter affecting the financial statements 
which is included in a note to the financial statements that more extensively 
discusses the matter. The addition of such an emphasis of matter paragraph does not 
affect the auditor's opinion. The paragraph would preferably be included preceding 
the opinion paragraph and would ordinarily refer to the fact that the auditor's opinion 
is not qualified in this respect.” The auditor should modify the auditor's report by 
adding a paragraph to highlight a material matter regarding a going concern problem 
where the going concern question is not resolved and adequate disclosures have not 
been made in the financial statements, or if there is a significant uncertainty (other 
than going concern problem), the resolution of which is dependent upon future 
events and which may affect the financial statements. Also according to AAS 28, a 
qualified opinion should be expressed when the auditor concludes that an unqualified 
opinion cannot be expressed but that the effect of any disagreement with 
management is not so material and pervasive as to require an adverse opinion, or 
limitation on scope is not so material and pervasive as to require a disclaimer of 
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opinion. A disclaimer of opinion should be expressed when the possible effect of a 
limitation on scope is so material and pervasive that the auditor has not been able to 
obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence and is, accordingly, unable to express an 
opinion on the financial statements. An adverse opinion should be expressed when 
the effect of a disagreement is so material and pervasive to the financial statements 
that the auditor concludes that a qualification of the report is not adequate to disclose 
the misleading or incomplete nature of the financial statements. 
Chapter 617 of the Companies Act (1956) defines a government company as 
one in which 51% of the paid-up share capital is held by a state government, the 
central government, or some combination of the state and the central governments. 
The term “government-owned companies in India” used in this study is consistent 
with the definition given above. Subsidiaries of such entities are also deemed to be 
government-owned companies. 
In addition, if a company has joint auditors and at least one of these joint 
auditors is linked to a Big 4 accounting firm, then this company observation is 
categorized as Type = 0 (audited by Big 4). I also include three sets of dummy 
variables to distinguish between financial companies and non-financial companies, 
between observations for each of the three years in the 2006-2008 period, and 
between companies according to industry type (manufacturing, mining, electricity, 
non-financial services, and construction). 
4.2.1 Financial variables 
 
I include as control variables in the model a number of client characteristic 
variables, which are examined in prior studies (e.g., DeFond et al., 2000) that may 
affect the likelihood of receiving a modified opinion. 
    I use Assets to proxy for client size by taking the logarithm of the client’s 
 29 
year-end total assets. As companies with greater assets are regarded as financially 
more healthy and reliable (Schwartz and Menon, 1985), I expect the Assets variable 
negatively correlated with the frequency of receiving a modified opinion. The ROE 
variable is also included in the audit opinion model and is expected to be negatively 
linked to the issuance of modified opinions. 
To control for the financial liquidity of companies, I use the current ratio 
(Current_ratio) and the debt to equity ratio (D/E_ratio) and expect the coefficient of 
Current_ratio to be negative and that of D/E_ratio to be positive. The ratios of 
inventory and accounts receivable to total client assets — Inventory and Receivables 
— are included to control for audit risk and complexity. These two variables are 
expected to be positively associated with the issuance of modified opinions. 
4.2.2 Year dummy variables 
 
To examine whether there is any special year effect in the 1,142 cross-sectional 
observations from 2006-2008, I employ two year dummy variables: Year_dummy_1 
and Year_dummy_2. The empirical results suggest that there is no special year effect 
related to the frequency of a modified opinion being issued. These two year dummy 
variables are included in the model but are not reported in Table 6 for brievity. 
4.2.3 Industry dummy variables 
 
The industry coding is based on the classification scheme adopted in the 
Prowess database. Companies are classified as non–financial (including 
manufacturing, mining, electricity, non-financial services, and construction 
companies) and financial services companies. Five dummy variables — 
Indu_dummy_1, Indu_dummy_2, Indu_dummy_3, Indu_dummy_4, and 
Indu_dummy_5 — are used in regression Model (2) to capture the influence of each 
of these six different industries (the five industries classified as non-financial and the 
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financial services industry). 
    The sample firms include 639 manufacturing companies, 23 mining companies, 
35 electricity companies, 240 non-financial service companies, 57 construction 
companies, and 148 financial companies. The five industry dummy variables are 
included in the model but are not reported in Table 6 for brievity. 
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Chapter 5  Empirical Results 
Table 4 reports descriptive information on client firm characteristics divided by 
class of firm ownership and auditor type in Panel A and summarizes the statistical 
relationship between auditor opinion and auditor type in Panel B. The analysis of 
mean F-values indicates that Auditors-Fees and Receivables differ significantly in 
the two firm ownership categories: Indian government-owned companies and 
non-government-owned companies. Panel B of Table 4 shows that among Indian 
government-owned companies, the percentage of companies that receive a modified 
auditor opinion is 64.5% for those audited by local Indian auditors and 63.6% for 
those audited by Big 4 auditors. However, among non-government-owned companies, 
the percentage of companies that receive a modified auditor opinion is 20.6% for 
those audited by local Indian auditors and 25.4% for those audited by Big 4 auditors. 
The differences between these two sets of results indicate that Indian 
government-owned companies are more likely to receive a qualified opinion than 
non-government-owned companies as proposed by Hypothesis 2. 
Further, in Panel C of Table 4, the percentage of companies receiving modified 
auditor opinions from joint auditors is reported as 40.4%, while the percentage of 
companies receiving a modified opinion from a single auditor is only 23.8%. These 
results support the view that companies audited by joint auditors are significantly 







Table 4: Descriptive statistics on client firm characteristics, auditor opinions divided by 





Companies Analysis  










 (Mean) (Mean)  (Mean) (Mean)   
Panel A: Client firm characteristics      
Assets 4.098 3.022 3.716 2.728 0.099
Inventories 0.100 0.128  0.102 0.129 2.069  
Receivables 0.128 0.109  0.150 0.209 4.560 * 
Current_ratio 1.927 1.250  1.992 2.014 0.340  
D/E_ratio 0.915 0.747  1.184 0.763 0.431  
ROE 2.781 1.619  1.905 2.260 0.380  
Auditors_Fees 2.976 0.190  2.110 0.425 6.723 ** 
Age 9.883 5.286  11.658 11.662 2.218  






 Local Auditors Big 4 Auditors  Local Auditors Big 4 Auditors 
 Number % Number %  Number % Number % 
Panel B: Auditor opinions and auditor type 
Unqualified 
 opinion 61 35.5 4 36.4  251 79.4 528 74.6 
Modified    
 opinion 50 64.5 3 63.6  65 20.6 180 25.4 
N 111 100 7 100  316 100 708 100 
 
 
     Joint Auditors            Single Auditor 
 Number % Number % 
Panel C: Auditor opinions and joint auditors         
Unqualified Opinion 99 59.6 735 76.2 
Modified Opinion 67 40.4 229 23.8 
N 166 100 964 100 
 
Notes: χ2 test for the difference between auditor opinion and auditor type for   
government-owned companies: χ2 = 0.013, p = 0.613; 
      χ2 test for the difference between auditor opinion and auditor type for 
non-government-owned companies: χ2 = 2.828, p = 0.054; 
      χ2 test for the difference between auditor opinion and MS (joint auditors or single 
auditor): χ2 = 20.200, p = 0.000. 
      ** Represents statistical significance at the 1% level. 
      * Represents statistical significance at the 5% level. 





Table 5 presents the probit regression results for auditor choice from Model (1) 
based on the full sample of 1,142 firm-year observations during the 2006-2008 
period. The model is significant at the 5% level, indicating a significant relationship 
between the dependent and the independent variables. All of the significant 
coefficient signs in the model are in the expected direction. The ownership variable 
has a positive coefficient (at the 1% significance level), showing that Indian 
government-owned companies are more likely to choose local Indian auditors. The 
coefficient of MS is negative (at the 1% significance level), indicating that the 
appointment of joint auditors normally involves all local auditors. In addition, the 
coefficients for Assets and Auditors_fees are significantly negative at the 1% and 5% 
significance levels, respectively, suggesting that companies that have a larger asset 















Table 5: Heckman first-step probit regression of self-selection of auditor(s)  
(Dependent variable: Locality) 
 Predicted Sign Coeft. Z-Statistic P-Value 
Constant  -4.316 -11.130 0.000 
Ownership + 1.486 6.330 0.000** 
MS - -0.405 -2.720 0.006** 
Assets - 1.295 13.810 0.000** 
Inventories + 0.399 1.000 0.319 
Receivables + -0.220 -0.580 0.564 
Current_ratio - 0.044 1.380 0.169 
D/E_ratio + -0.047 -1.890 0.059 
ROE - 0.025 1.400 0.162 
Auditors_fees - -0.035 -1.970 0.049* 
Age - -0.002 -0.310 0.760 
Lambda  0.377 3.520 0.000 
Sample Size    1142 
 
Notes: ** Represents statistical significance at the 1% level. 
      * Represents statistical significance at the 5% level. 

















In the second step of the regression based on Model (2), I test my hypotheses 
and identify the determinants of auditor opinion issuance. I include Ownership, Type, 
Own*Type, MS, MS*Big4, the six financial control variables, F_dummy, 
Year_dummy_1-2, and Indu_dummy_1-5 in the regression. The inverse Mills ratios 
are also incorporated to control for the self-selection problem between auditees and 
auditors. The positive coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio suggests that Indian 
government-owned companies more often select local auditors than randomly 
selected companies would select.  
Table 6 shows the findings of the second-step opinion issuance logit model with 
and without the inverse Mills ratios. When the logit regression is run without the 
inverse Mills ratios, the direction of the coefficient on Ownership is consistent with 
the prediction, but not significance. However, after adding the inverse Mills ratios to 
the binary logit regression model to control for self-selection bias, the coefficient 
becomes significant. Moreover, pseudo R-squared for the overall model increases by 
nearly 1.7%.  
In addition, instead of excluding the 148 observations of financial companies 
from the full sample which will significantly reduce sample size, I create a dummy 
variable (F_dummy) that is equal to 1 for financial company observations and is 
equal to 0 for non-financial company observations. This dummy is employed to 
identify whether financial companies and non-financial companies differ 
significantly in auditor reporting quality. The empirical regression result reported in 
Table 6 indicates no difference in the possibility of receiving a modified auditor 





Table 6: Heckman second-step logit regression of opinion issuance  
(Dependent variable: Opinion) 
  Original Adjusted by Imills
 
Predicted 
Sign Coeft. Wald χ2 P-value Coeft. Wald χ2 P-value 
Constant  -2.461 9.719 0.002 -7.622 1.000 0.000 
Ownership + 0.892 1.415 0.234 2.101 6.332 0.012* 
Type - -0.822 14.672 0.000* -0.688 9.553 0.002* 
Own*Type ? -0.004 0.000 0.996 -0.708 0.711 0.399 
MS - -0.952 14.780 0.000* -0.892 11.862 0.001* 
MS*Big4 ? 1.172 6.055 0.014* 0.691 1.902 0.168 
Assets - 0.258 5.308 0.021* 1.345 20.409 0.000* 
Inventories + -0.457 0.528 0.467 0.376 0.310 0.578 
Receivables + 0.716 1.711 0.191 0.680 1.540 0.215 
Current_ratio - 0.001 0.014 0.907 0.108 5.608 0.018* 
D/E_ratio + -0.019 0.223 0.637 -0.047 1.317 0.251 
ROE - -0.003 0.017 0.897 0.012 0.316 0.574
F_dummy  0.459 0.651 0.420 0.391 0.430 0.512 
Yeardummy_1  0.055 0.098 0.754 0.056 0.096 0.757 
Yeardummy_2  -0.043 0.060 0.807 -0.008 0.002 0.965 
INDU_dummy_1  0.412 0.571 0.450 0.537 0.891 0.345 
INDU_dummy_3  0.451 0.416 0.519 0.293 0.157 0.692 
INDU_dummy_4  0.333 0.355 0.551 0.479 0.676 0.411 
INDU_dummy_5  0.459 0.547 0.459 0.575 0.804 0.370 
Imills +    1.327 1.000 0.000 
Pseudo
2R     0.041   0.058 
Sample Size    1142   1142 
  
LR chi2(18) = 53.52 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
LR chi2(18) = 75.03 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
 
Notes: * Represents statistical significance at the 5% level. 
      All variables are as defined in Table 1. 












The adjusted binary logit regression results for the auditor opinion issuance 
determinants are reported on the right-hand side of Table 6. The empirical results are 
consistent with my three hypotheses. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the Type variable 
relates negatively to Opinion at the 1% significance level, providing good support for 
the prediction that Big 4 firms provide audits of higher quality than those of their 
local counterparts in India. The coefficient for Ownership is also significant at 5% 
level and supports the prediction in Hypothesis 2 that Indian government-owned 
companies are more likely to receive modified opinions than non-government-owned 
companies. This finding supports the view that the Indian government assumes a 
supervisory rather than a collusive role when interacting with the auditors of Indian 
government-owned companies. The coefficient for MS is significant at 1% level and 
is negative, thereby confirming the expectation of Hypothesis 3 that audits conducted 
by joint auditors are of higher quality than those conducted by a single auditor.  
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Chapter 6  Conclusions 
This research extends previous accounting research on auditor independence 
and audit quality in the setting of India, a country about which relatively few prior 
studies have been conducted. I investigate the correlation between auditor type, firm 
ownership, and the issuance of auditor opinions under the joint audit requirement. I 
report exploratory empirical results based on a sample of 1,142 firm-year 
observations from the 2006-2008 period for firms listed on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE) that are members of the A-group of 200 companies and B-group 
firms audited by Big 4 affiliates in India.  
First, my findings support the prediction that companies audited by Big 4 
auditors (international auditors) are more likely to receive a modified opinion than 
companies audited by local Indian auditors. In contrast to an earlier study on India 
that uses aduit fee as the measure of audit quality (Simon et al., 1986), I use the 
frequency of receiving a modified audit opinion as the measure of audit quality 
which avoids low balling and other complexities affecting audit fees. Second, 
government-owned companies are associated with greater likelihood of receiving 
qualified opinions than non-government-owned companies in India, indicating the 
special supervisory role of the Indian government. Finally, the joint audit 
requirement is associated with a higher audit quality, which complements prior 
research findings on joint audit requirement in France but in a single country setting. 
    This exploratory empirical study has a number of limitations that should be 
taken into account in interpreting the results. First, because data on audit fees among 
joint auditors is unavailable at the firm level, I cannot have a more precise measure 
of the auditor fees variable (the amount allocated to each auditor) in the regression 
models used in this study. Second, because the research period is limited to 
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2006-2008, further research based on data from other periods may further confirm 
the results obtained. Third, although the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) is the 
biggest and most important stock exchange in India and its A-group and B-group 
firms are the best listed companies on the BSE, the sample selection method 
employed means this study is skewed towards larger Indian firms. I have not studied 
companies listed on India’s two other stock exchanges, the CSE (the Calcutta Stock 
Exchange) and the NSE (the National Stock Exchange). However, it is unrealistic to 
expect a single study to address all the gaps that exist in the prior literature. 
Furthermore, given that this is an exploratory empirical study, it is reasonable to start 
with a sample of higher quality listed companies.  
    This paper has implications for policy makers and users of financial information 
on listed firms regarding the quality of auditor reporting in India. First, the Big 4 
auditors are confirmed to be associated with higher auditor reporting quality in the 
Indian setting. Hence, investors and information users should have a good degree of 
confidence in Big 4 auditor opinions issued on Indian companies. Second, Indian 
government-owned companies are more likely to receive qualified auditor opinions. 
This result indicates the constructive role played by regulators such as the CAG in 
ensuring sufficient supervisory oversight and is a lesson that can be transferred to 
other transitional economies that suffer from collusion between government and 
auditors in the audits of government-owned companies. Finally, the results of this 
study show that the joint audit requirement enhances auditor reporting quality, which 
should provide an encouragement for other countries to consider the use of joint 
auditors. 
Further research may examine how the professional reputation of Big 4 auditors 
and their brand recognition in the Indian audit service market have been affected by 
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the Satyam scandal that occurred in January 2009. The Satyam Scandal is sometimes 
called India's Enron, which was publicly announced on 7 January 2009, when 
Chairman of the company, Ramalinga Raju, confessed that Satyam's accounts had 
been falsified for up to $1 billion. As the auditor of Satyam in 2009 was 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, this scandal has shaken investor confidence in one of the 
world’s Big Four accounting firms, which have expanded rapidly in Asia despite a 
general shortage of qualified accountants. This study can also be considered as an 
exploratory investigation that ushers the way for researchers and regulators to study 
and compare factors that contribute to audit quality in transitional economies. 
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Appendix 1: Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) group classifications 
 
Group A: Shares in this category have high levels of liquidity, market capitalization and 
capital appreciation. 
 
Groups B1 and B2: Similar to A and with good liquidity, but slightly lower levels of market 
capitalization and capital appreciation. These are financially healthy stocks. 
 
Group T: Transactions in these shares must be settled by way of delivery only. Transactions 
in shares trading with a "T" designation require the actual delivery of scripts. 
 
Group S: The Exchange has introduced a new segment named “BSE Indonext” with effect 
from January 7, 2005. The “S” group represents scripts forming part of the “BSE Indonext” 
segment. The “S” group consists of scripts from the “B1” & “B2” groups on the BSE and 
companies exclusively listed on regional stock exchanges that have capital of 30 million 
rupees to 300 million rupees. All tradings in this segment are done through the BOLT system 
under the S group. 
 
Group TS: The “TS” group consists of scripts in the “BSE-Indonext” segments which are 
settled on a trade-to-trade basis as a surveillance measure. 
 
Group Z: Suspended lots of shares. Shares in this group are suspended due to 
non-compliance with exchange board rules. 
 
Apart from these equity groups, there are two other groups: fixed income securities (group F, 
a debt market segment) and government securities (group G). For more details, see the 
source: http://www.bseindia.com/about/tradnset.asp. 
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Appendix 2: Names of BIG 4 affiliates in India 
 
 Big 4 Affiliates in India 
Deloitte Deloitte Haskins & Sells, C. C. Chokshi & Co., A. F. Ferguson & 
Co, A. F. Ferguson & Associates, S.B. Billimoria & Co., and P. C. 
Hansotia 
Ernst & Young S.R. Batliboi & Company, S. R Batliboi & Associates, and  
S.V. Ghatalia & Associates 
KPMG BSR, BSR & Associates, and BSR & Company 
Price Waterhouse Price Waterhouse, Price Waterhouse & Co, Lovelock & Lewes ,  
RSM & Co., and Dalal & Shah 
 
Notes:  
1. Some of the Big 4 affiliates in India cannot use their global brand names due to 
regulations issued by the ICAI in 1988 specifying that “The name of any firm that wants to 
register for ICAI membership must have a combination of the names of the partners or a 
name in being, that is a name in use before this rule was introduced.” 
2. Indian affiliates of the Big 4 international network firms operate using their pre-1988 
registered brand names (eg. DTT and PRICE WATERHOUSE). The other two Big 4 firms 
(ERNST & YOUNG and KPMG) did not have any firms registered with the ICAI before 
1988 and hence must use completely unconnected Indian member firm brand names. In 
addition, all four firms have private limited companies registered in India that use the global 
brand and actively sell all the firm’s services other than those that must be provided by ICAI 
members. These private limited companies are not required to follow the strict code of ethics 
and are not subject to other ICAI rules and regulations. 
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